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I. Introduction 
In this paper we analyze the problem of optimal 
intertemporal pricing for a monopolist when cur-
rent (and past) output affect future cost and/or 
demand conditions through "experience" in 
production and/or in consumption. Learning by 
doing, the experience curve, contagion, habit 
formation, bandwagon, and snob effects are all 
examples of terminologies used to describe such 
situations. We call these "experience effects" 
for convenience and explore profit-maximizing 
pricing behavior when such effects exist.1 
In the traditional profit-maximization model, a 
firm chooses the price-output combination so as 
to maximize short-run (i.e., current) profits. The 
familiar MC = MR equality (given that price is 
higher than average variable cost and a nonbind-
ing capacity constraint) is a necessary condition for 
price takers as well as price makers. This as-
sumes that the current pricing decision has no 
bearing on the future, so that long-run profit is 
maximized by a series of short-run maximizing 
*We would like to thank our colleagues Frank Milne, 
Thomas Russell, and Hersh Shefrin for their helpful com-
ments. The first author gratefully acknowledges the support 
of the Killam Foundation (Canada Council Killam Research 
Fellow) and of the National Sciences and Engineering Re-
search Council of Canada (grant A9082). 
1. Here we used the word "experience" to encapsulate all 
situations where the present depends on the integral or sum of 
past values of decision variables. 
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© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0021-9398/82/5504-0005$01.50 
517 
We use a general model 
to analyze the optimal 
intertemporal pricing 
policy for a monopolist 
when current and past 
output play a role in 
determining future cost 
and/or demand condi-
tions through "experi-
ence" in production 
and/or in consumption. 
As would be expected, 
the optimal price path 
depends on the manner 
in which experience af-
fects demand and cost 
functions. Three special 
cases are scrutinized: 
( 1) learning by doing in 
which production costs 
are scaled downward 
over time; (2) learning 
by doing in which pro-
duction costs are trans-
lated downward over 
time; and (3) the case of 
demand satiation. For 
these cases, the optimal 
price paths are shown to 
be, respectively, de-
creasing, increasing, 
and nonmonotonic. 
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decisions. When this independence condition does not hold, however, 
it is not possible to maximize long-run profits by using such myopic 
decision rules. For example, a firm may set a price lower than that 
dictated by the short-run optimum in order to increase current sales, if 
this larger sale leads to lower costs in the future. The phenomenon of 
cost falling with cumulative production is often referred to as "learning 
by doing" or the "experience curve" phenomenon. In this case, a 
J1rice lower than the myopic price may seem to be intuitive. However, 
a series of questions immediately comes to mind for which neither 
intuition nor the traditional marginal conditions provide easy solution. 
Among these questions are the following: Should price be continuously 
lowered throughout the planning horizon? If so, at what rate? In other 
words, what is the optimal price path? Are there situations when price 
goes up, goes down, or fluctuates? Does it vary continuously or exhibit 
jumps? Obviously the answers to these questions depend on specifics: 
In particular, exactly how do current output and sales affect future 
costs and/or demand? 
These questions have been touched upon in the literature, mostly in 
the context of experience curves and the market penetration (or con-
tagion) model. The former deals with the widely observed phenomenon 
of falling cost due to experience (learning) in production. Such cost 
reductions are not a result of economies of scale, but rather of en-
dogenously induced technological change. 2 In this case, production 
costs will be a function not only of current output but also of past 
production (cumulative output). The latter phenomenon deals with 
situations such as diffusion of innovations in which market demand for 
a durable good increases at first and decreases eventually as the prod-
uct becomes more widely accepted and the market becomes saturated. 
Demand, therefore, depends not only on price but also on past pur-
chases (cumulative sales). 
Bass (1969, 1980) focused on the question of diffusion and adoption 
rates of consumer durables. Assumed in his model (1980) are: (1) a 
marginal cost function which decreases with total cumulative output, 
and (2) a constant price elasticity of demand with changing market size. 
In addition, Bass postulates that (3) firms set prices according to 
short-run profit-maximization principles. This latter assumption com-
bined with (1), results in a monotonically decreasing price over time. 
The model discussed by Bass is fundamentally different from the 
present model which focuses on the intertemporal or long-run op-
timizing behavior of a monopolist in the presence of experience effects. 
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) have adopted a model similar to that of 
Bass to analyze the question of dynamic pricing strategy. Again de-
2. The primary distinction between technological change induced by learning and the 
more familiar technological change of, say, growth theory, is the endogenous and 
exogenous origins, respectively, of changes. 
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mand and cost vary with past sales. In a discretized example involving 
specific parameterizations of demand and cost functions, the optimal 
price path is calculated numerically and is shown to be quite different 
from that given by short-run profit maximization. 
Dolan and Jeuland (1981) and Jeuland and Dolan (1982) have 
analyzed optimal pricing strategies when experience effects exist on 
both cost and demand sides of the market. In these papers, however, 
the authors assume that unit production costs are independent of the 
production rate and follow Bass in adopting specific parametric repre-
sentation of demand, thus limiting the scope of their conclusions. 
Spence (1981) explores some of the implications for competition in 
an industry where firm costs decline over time due to "learning." He 
focuses on the case of no discounting and, like each of the authors 
referenced, adopts a specialized functional form for firm cost func-
tions. We show below that such cost specifications constrain the opti-
mal price trajectory to be monotonically falling over time. This will not 
be the case in general. 
It is the purpose of this paper to build and analyze a general model 
which encompasses various experience situations including the models 
discussed above. The next section presents this model. The third 
section deals in more detail with two cases of learning by doing in 
which learning influences cost in two distinct manners: In one case, the 
optimal price falls and, in the other, increases throughout the entire 
planning period. The satiation process in demand is analyzed in a 
similar manner in Section IV. The fifth section contains an example in 
which the optimal price path exhibits jump discontinuities, even though 
all the data are continuous. A brief summary and conclusions are 
followed by the Appendix which addresses the question of the exis-
tence of optimal price paths. 
II. The General Model 
We denote by x the (cumulative) quantity sold of commodity X in the 
past and p the price of X (which can be interpreted as the reservation 
price). Then, 
x = q(x,p), (1) 
where .X= dxldt, current output, andq(x,p) is the demand function. In 
addition, we have 
c(x,q), (2) 
a given production cost function. Both q and c are assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable, with the partial derivative qp < 0 
everywhere, and q > 0 for all nonnegative prices. 
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The problem the firm faces is to choose the optimal time path for p in 
such a way as to maximize the present value of the stream of profit. 
That is 
max fr e-61{pq(x,p) - c[x,q(x,p)]}dt, 
p(t) J 0 (3) 
wherep(·) is piecewise continuous and assumes values in (O,oo), andx 
satisfies (1) and x(O) = x0 , the cumulative output at t = 0. We shall 
assume that an optimal solution (x ,p) exists (the existence question is 
addressed in the Appendix). 
We proceed by applying the maximum principle to this optimal 
control problem (see, e.g., Intriligator 1971). The Hamiltonian 
H(t,x,A,p), where A is the adjoint variable, is given by Aq(x,p) + 
e-6t{pq(x,p) - c[x,q(x,p)]}. The adjoint equation in this case is 
(4) 
The fact that H(t,X,A,") achieves a maximum over(O,oo) atp givesHp = 
0; in this case 
Aqp + e-at (q + pqP - c qqp) = 0. 
We solve (5) for A to obtain 
A = e-at (cq - p - q/qp). 
Substitution of (6) into (4) gives 
A. =e-at (ex + qqxlqp). 
The maximum principle also yields the transversality condition 
A(T) = 0. 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
For later reference we note the relation HPP ~ 0 along the optimal 
trajectory (x ,p). Therefore 
(9) 
It is common practice to interpret A as a shadow price, and then use 
equations such as (4) and (5) as the basis for policy prescriptions. 
However, it is possible to eliminate A from these equations and to 
define a function 1> which appreciably enhances the interpretability of 
solutions. We set 
1>(x,p) = Cq[x,q(x,p)] - p - q(x,p)/qp(x,p). (10) 
In view of (6), along the optimal path [x(t),p(t)], we have 1>[x(t),p(t)] 
= e6tA, the "spot shadow price," a function oft which is continuous. 
By using (6) and (7), we then calculate 
d . 
dt 1>[x(t),p(t)] = 1> = 81> + qqx/qp + Cx. (11) 
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Let us note that, in light of (8), one has 1> (T) = 0. Further (9) implies 
f/>vqv ~ 0 at [x(t),p(t)] (12) 
Solving the ordinary differential equation (11) for 1> (t), we obtain 
f/>(f) =-rT (Cx + qqxfqp)e-15(r-tldr. 
When this is expressed in terms of the original variables, we obtain the 
following theorem. 
THEOREM: The following relationship holds along the optimal price 
path: 
Notice that p(t) + qlqv is the usual "short-run" marginal revenue 
(MR), the immediate benefit, from selling one more unit, and Cq is the 
usual "short-run" marginal cost (MC) of producing one more unit. The 
integral term is the present value of the "long-run effects" of the 
current and past actions. It is obvious from (13) that when ex "I 0 and/or 
qx I- 0 (i.e., when experience effects are present), the usual short-run 
marginal cost pricing rule no longer yields an optimal policy. There 
must be a "wedge" between MR and MC (the value of the integral in 
[13]). As an example, consider the case in which ex < 0 (i.e., learning 
by doing) and qx = 0. Since the integral is necessarily negative in this 
case, we have MC > MR along the optimal path for all time except at T. 
The wedge between MC and MR represents the present value offuture 
cost reductions due to an increase in cumulative output (experience). 
In this sense, (13) can be considered as the dynamic analogue of the 
short-run (static) marginal condition. Of course one may interpret (13) 
as a condition which equates "full long-run MC" to "full long-run 
MR''; the theorem simply tells one how these full marginal values are 
to be calculated. 
If p is differentiable, we derive from (10) the following relation: 
(14) 
But</> = 84> + qqxlqv +ex from (11). Substituting this into (14), we get 
(15) 
Recall thatf/> is the wedge betweenMC andMR, orf/>(t) = MC(t)-
MR(t). Furthermore, we have from (10): 1>x = aMC/ax - aMR/ax. 
Since q = i, we can now rewrite (14) as 
· ,~,. =;, _ ( aMC _ iJMR). 
P'fJP 'fJ ax ax X' 
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or equivalently 
f/:1 dp = df/:1 _ ( oMC _ oMR )dx. 
p ox ox (16) 
As long as cpp 1- 0, we have dp determined by the difference between 
df/:1 and[· ]dx. The df/:1 represents how the wedge is changing, and[· ]dx 
represents how MC and MR are affected by the cumulative output. In 
other words, the direction of change in the optimal price depends on 
the two (possibly opposing) effects: (1) how fast the spot shadow price 
of x changes, and (2) how MC and MR are affected by x. One might 
interpret these effects as long-run (potential) and short-run (realized) 
effects. Equation (16) proves to be extremely useful in interpreting our 
results. In particular, diagrammatic analyses will be presented in the 
next two sections to sort out the two effects and to analyze how the 
optimal price changes. 
As we show in Section V, p(t) may not be continuous, let alone 
differentiable everywhere. There is, however, a simple additional hy-
pothesis that will guarantee continuity of p(t). 
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that q and c satisfy globally the inequality 
Cqqq;, - 2qp + qqpp/qp > 0. (17) 
Then the optimal price path p(t) is continuous and differentiable on 
[O,T]. 
PROOF: If(17) holds, thenHPP < 0 everywhere. Thus, the equation 
Hp[t ,x(t),A(t),p] = 0 uniquely defines p = p(t), and differentiability of 
p (t) follows as a consequence of the implicit function theorem. 
REMARK: The inequality in the statement of the proposition is 
satisfied, for example, if q(x,p) = f(x)g(p ), in which/> 0, g ;?! 0, g' < 
0, g is concave and, in addition, c is convex in q. Examples include 
exponential functions for g(p ). 
III. Learning by Doing 
We shall now study two special cases of the general model in which 
we impose additional structure, and in so doing arrive at certain global 
information regarding the behavior of the optimal price path. Both 
cases are instances of learning by doing, that is, experience has the 
beneficial effect oflowering the cost function (ex < 0). Yet, as we shall 
see, the specific way in which costs are lowered is important in deter-
mining the price profile: in one case the optimal price is an increasing 
function of time and, in the other, a decreasing function of time. 
The Case of Scaling in c. 
We assume that in this subsection c(x,q) has the form 
c0 + m(x)h(q), (18) 
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where m(x) > 0, m'(x) < 0, h(O) = 0, h(q) > 0, h'(q) > 0, and h is 
convex. Thus, the production cost curve is scaled downward as x 
increases.3 We assume that demand is unaffected by experience: qx = 
0. Note that for a range of parameter values, a differentiable optimal 
price pathp(t) is known to exist (see Appendix). For present purposes, 
however, we merely assume that such exists. 
PROPOSITION 2: In this case, the optimal price path is a decreasing 
function of time. 
PROOF: The equation (11) becomes in this case 
<i> = 8cf> + m'(x)h(q) < 8cf>. 
Now if cf> were ever negative or 0, then the solution to this differential 
equation would necessarily be negative beyond that point. But cf> (T) = 
0 from (8), so we conclude that cf> (t) > 0 for all t < T. Equation (15) 
becomes in this case 
(19) 
since, for this problem, cf>x = Cqx· We now claim that ex - qcqx is 
nonnegative; it then follows from (19) that p is negative, since the 
right-hand side is positive and cf>v ~ 0 (from [12]). To prove this claim, 
observe that ex - qcqx reduces to 
m'(x)[h(q) - qh'(q)], 
so it suffices to show h(q)- qh'(q) ~ 0. But from the convexity of h, 
we know 
h(q) = h(q) - h(O) ~ qh'(q). 
Q.E.D. 
We now turn our attention to a diagrammatic exposition of this 
special case. Since qx = 0, equation (16) becomes cf>vdP = dcf> 
iJMC!ox dx, which is strictly positive fort < T. This implies that 
I a~c I dx + dcf> > o. 
The case when dcf> is negative is shown in figure 1. Comparing two 
points of time t and t + a, we see the MC curve shifting from MCt to 
MCtH. The wedge between MC and MR required for dynamic profit 
maximization changes from cf>t to cf>t+a (with cf>t+a < cf>t)· But if this 
reduction in the wedge is smaller than the reduction in MC (i.e., aMC 
in the diagram), then the optimal output will increase from qt to qt+A, 
hence price falls. If dcf> is positive, then it is clear that the two effects 
reinforce each other, resulting in a price reduction. 
In this case, even though the long-run potential benefit from added 
3. A case treated by Bass and others which falls in this category is that in which 
marginal cost is constant (i.e., h linear in q) and m (x) = [Y. 
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FIG. 1 
experience may be decreasing as the end of the planning period is 
approached, this is outweighed by the (realized) reduction in marginal 
cost. Thus, the firm decides to lower price continuously. 
The Case of Translation in c 
We assume now that c(x,q) has the form 
c0 + s(x) + r(q), (20) 
where r' > 0, s' < 0, and s is convex on (O,oo). Thus, in this case, 
experience translates (shifts) the cost curve downward. We continue to 
assume qx = 0. Again, the proposition in the Appendix implies the 
existence of a smooth optimal price path for at least a subclass of such 
problems. 
PROPOSITION 3: In this case, the optimal price path is an increasing 
function of time. 
PROOF: If we substitute our particular c into cp, we see that <Px = 0 
in this case, and (15) now becomes 
pcpp = Cx + 8cp = s'[x(t)] - 8 J:s'[x(T)]e-B<r-n dT. 
Our task reduces to proving that the right-hand side of this equation is 
negative (for cpp ~ 0 from [12]), which we proceed to do. 
Since s is convex, s' is nondecreasing, so: 
s '[x(t)] - 8 J: s '[x( T)]e-B<r-n dT 
~ s'[X(t)] - 8s'[x(t)]rT e-B(r-f)dT 
=s'[x(t)]{ 1 - 8rT e-B(r-tli)T} 
= s'[x(t)]e-a<r-t> < 0. 
Q.E.D. 
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It is a simple matter to show (see fig. 2) why the optimal price 
increases. Since the cost function is additively separable, we have 
oMC/ox = 0. Thus, (16) becomes <f>pdp = d<f>. Butci> = 8<f> + Cx = 8<f> + 
s' = p<f>p, which has been shown to be strictly negative above. Thus, 
d<f> or ci> < 0. As the wedge between MC and MR becomes smaller 
(since future benefits from a cost reduction become smaller), the opti-
mal quantity falls, hence the optimal price increases. 
This is a case in which experience reduces total cost, without affecting 
marginal cost. On the other hand, "fixed cost" is reduced; for exam-
ple, organization of the production process may benefit from experi-
ence. However, actual production of each unit may not; since MC in 
terms of, say, additional materials and labor time required might be 
exactly the same. In such a case, larger sales (by pricing lower) are 
warranted in view of future cost reductions. But the gains from such 
policies decrease continuously over time: hence, a continuous price 
mcrease. 
In summary, the two cases studied in this section both deal with 
learning by doing, where production cost is reduced by experience, yet 
they are dramatically dissimilar with respect to optimal pricing policy. 
It has been shown that this is due to the nature of the cost reduction: 
The marginal cost function is lowered in the first case, but not in the 
second. 
IV. Demand Experience 
When we examine demand cases analogous to those of Section III, 
we find that, in contrast to the case of learning, the behavior of the 
price path is not generally monotonic. We shall illustrate this in the 
case in which q (x ,p) is of the form 
q (x ,p) = a- (x )p (p), (21) 
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and c (x ,q) = c0 q. This formulation was used by Robinson and Lakhani 
in an attempt to model the case of consumer durables .4 
We assume that O" (x) and p (p) are positive, with p 1 < 0, that for x in 
(O,x0), 0" 1(X) = 0, and that for x in [x0 ,oo), 0" 1(X) < 0. Thus, x0 can be 
viewed as a threshhold beyond which consumer satiation begins. 
PROPOSITION 4: In this case, for sufficiently large horizons (T), the 
optimal price path exhibits at least one period of increase and at least 
one period of decrease. 
PROOF: In this case (11) becomes cb = 6</> + 0" 1 p2/p 1 ~ 61> and it 
follows as in Proposition 2 that</> ~ 0. We suppose Tis large enough so 
that the threshold x0 is breached; thus, cb > 6</> fort beyond a certain 
point. It then follows that 1> is strictly negative for t < T. 
We tum to (15), which now transmutes to p<f>p = 6</> + p20" 1 /p 1 • 
Initially (when x < x0 ) the right-hand side is negative, sop > 0. Fort 
near T, <f>(t) is almost zero, since <f>(T) = 0, so the right-hand side must 
be positive; that is, p < 0. Q.E.D. 
To supplement the mathematical derivation of the property of p, we 
shalf now give a heuristic exposition of this case using MR and MC 
curves. Equation (16) becomes <f>pdp = d<f> + fJMR!ax dx. 
For x in (O,x0), we have 0" 1(X) = 0, thus cb = 6</> < 0 (since 1> < 0) and 
aMR!ax = 0. Thus, in this case, the (negative) wedge betweenMC and 
MR is growing larger in magnitude, resulting in price increases. This 
can be interpreted as growing spot shadow prices as the satiation point 
is approached; that is, the negative benefit is felt more strongly as we 
get close (see fig. 3). 
However, once the satiation point (x > x0 ) is reached, two effects 
again begin to interact. When (16) is positive, we have d<f> + aMR!Ox 
dx > 0. 
Assume that consumer satiation decreases both demand and MR 
(see fig. 4). Since 1> (T) = 0 and 1> < 0, cb > 0 sufficiently near T (d</> > 
0). Thus, we have 
I aMR I ----ax dx < d</> or il.<f> > il.MR. 
The wedge is shrinking fast enough to compensate for the reduction in 
MR. In this case we see an increasing q and, hence, a decreasing p. 
V. Example 
The purpose of this section is to give a specific example in which the 
unique optimal price path is a discontinuous function of time. Besides 
4. In their formulation, demand for the durable at any point of time is a function of x 
andp, but is independent of pricing history. We feel this is not an entirely realistic model 
for durables. Since consumers "typically" buy only one unit, current demand should 
depend on which segments of population (differentiated by their reservation prices) have 
bought in the past. 
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FIG. 3 
showing that our attention to this issue in Section II was not unwar-
ranted, the example demonstrates, perhaps counterintuitively, that 
sudden large price fluctuations are not necessarily a sign of 
mismanagement-they may, in fact, be unavoidable in the optimal 
price path. 
We take for q(x,p) the function e-P1100 , and we choose [0,1] as the 
planning period, with x 0 = 0. It follows that x and q lie in [0, 1] at all 
times. Let a < {3 < y < 1/3 be three positive numbers, and letf(q) be 
any continuously differentiable function which satisfies the following 
conditions: 
i) f(q);;?; 0 for q e [0,1];/(q) = 0 if and only if q = {3 or y. 
ii) lf'(q) I ::;; 1 for q e [0,1/3]. 
iii) f'(q);;?; 1 for q e [1/3,3/4]. 
iv) f'(q) > 104 for q e [3/4, 1]. 
We use the cost function defined by c(x,q) = -100q lnq + f(q) + 
g(x,q), where g(x,q) =[max {(x- a)(q- {3)2 , (a- x)(q - y)2}]2• The 
function g is continuously differentiable, as is q lnq for q > 0. Further, 
conditions i-iv above were specified to imply Cq > 0. (It is a simple 
matter to verify this on each of the intervals [0,1/3], [1/3,3/4] and [3/4,1] 
MC 
MR 
FIG. 4 
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if one observes the inequality I gq I :;;:;; 4.) Thus, cis not unreasonable in 
the role of a cost function. 
For this case, the optimal pricing problem reduces to minimizing 
-J01 e-M [pq - c(x,q)]dt 
=-L1 e-~> 1 [-lOOq lnq- c(x,q)]dt 
= J01 e-M [f(x) + g(x,x)]dt 
= J01 e-Mh(x,x)dt, 
where we have defined h = f + g. Note that h is nonnegative by 
construction, and can only equal zero when bothf and g are zero. This 
can only happen in two ways: if q = y andx:;;:;; a, or if q = f3 andx ~a. 
It follows that there is a unique policy which makes h = 0 everywhere 
(and consequently is optimal): Useq = x = y untilx =a, then switch to 
q = x = f3. In terms of price, this means that price is piecewise constant 
with an upward jump at time t = a/y. 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
We have analyzed the optimal intertemporal pncmg policy for a 
monopolist in the presence of experience effects. The solution to this 
"optimal control problem" is completely determined mathematically 
by the differential equations and boundary conditions of Section II. 
The dynamic analogue of the short-run marginal condition (Theorem, 
Sec. II) was shown to be 
MR = MC + rT (ex + qqxlqp)e-ll(T-t)dT, (22) 
where we have referred to the integral term as the wedge between MC 
and MR required for long-run optimality. 
It is clear from our analysis that short-run profit-maximizing decision 
rules will not, in general, lead to maximum long-run profit when ex-
perience effects are present. Although the phenomenon of temporally 
falling prices is often observed in markets where experience effects are 
alleged to exist, it was shown that this is not the only scenario possible. 
The optimal price path depends on precisely how experience effects 
influence demand and cost functions. Three special cases were 
scrutinized in which the mathematical solution was supplemented by 
diagrammatic analysis. 
In the first case of learning by doing, we found that the optimal price 
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falls throughout the period. This result is due to the nature of the cost 
reduction: Cost is scaled downward and hence the MC curve falls 
over time. Intuitively we may say that the change in the long-run effect 
is outweighed by the change in the short-run effect. If MC falls fast 
enough, the firm should lower price continuously. 
When cost is translated downward due to experience, on the other 
hand, the optimal price increases throughout the period. Translation 
implies an MC function which is independent of x. Thus, the short-run 
effect is absent, and the change in the long-run effect determines the 
price path. Since the long-run benefit from experience declines over 
time, the incentive to sell large quantities also diminishes: hence, an 
increasing price path. 
A similar analysis was made of the case of experience effects on the 
demand side. If cumulative scales have negative impact on future 
demand (i.e., eventual satiation), then the price path will exhibit both 
periods of increase and decrease. 
Appendix 
Existence of Optimal Price Paths 
Direct application of general existence theorems from optimal control or the 
calculus of variations is difficult in the case of the problem treated in this 
article, for these would mandate the presence of constraints such as p 0 ~ p ~ 
P1. which we do not impose. To show, however, that existence is not a 
hopeless feature of the problem, we prove by ad hoc means the following result 
for a subclass of problems. 
Let q (x ,p) have the form f(p) = ae-13 P for a < 1. 
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that for some m > 0, the cost function c satisfies: 
(a) Cqq;.;;. - l!(a{3); (b) Cx;.;;. - m; (c) Cq;.;;. me 6Tffj - 11{3. Then there is an 
optimal price pathp(t) for the problem of Section II, with 0 <p(t) < oo, andp is 
continuous and differentiable. 
PROOF: The problem may be recast as that of minimizing 
= J.r e-61 [c(x,x) +.X 1n(xla)/{3]dt, (23) 
wherei = q lies in (O,oo). Now, the function v-i> c(x,v) + v ln(v/a)/{3 is convex 
as a consequence of (a) (its second derivative is positive on [O,a]), so that, from 
standard results, it can be shown that there is a solutionx(t) to minimizing (23) 
subject to 0 ~ i ~a. It remains to show that .X is never equal to 0 or a. We will 
show this by invoking the necessary conditions of Clarke (1976) for this 
"generalized problem of Bolza." These assert the existence of a function A 
satisfying: 
'A. = e-61cx for all t, A.(T) = 0, (24) 
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and the inequalities 
A(t) ~ e-81{cq + fv [v ln(v/a)/.BJv~.x} if 0 ~.X < a 
A(t) ~ e-81{cq + :fv [v ln(v/a)/.B]v~.x} if i = a. 
Now suppose in fact thati had the temerity to equal a somewhere. Then by 
the preceding A(T) ~ e-I>T{cq(x,a) + 1/,B} for someT, so by (b) we deduceA(T) 
~ m/a. On the other hand, (24) together with (c) yields A.(t) ~ m(l - e-fl'r)!a for 
all t, which is a contradiction. Thus, i is never a. 
That :X can never be 0 follows from the first general inequality for A, together 
with the observation d/dv [v ln(vla)!.B]v~o = - oo. 
As for the smoothness of p, it follows from applying proposition 1, Section 
II. Q.E.D. 
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